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Abstract
This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is …nanced
by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher’s moral hazard. It is shown
that …nancial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also
found that a subsidy to the …nancial sector may have larger growth e¤ects than a direct subsidy
to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R&D
may reduce the growth rate. I show that there exists a negative relation between the …nancing
of innovation and the process of capital accumulation. Concerning welfare, the presence of
two externalities of opposite sign steaming from …nancial activity may cause that the no-tax
equilibrium provides an ine¢cient level of …nancial services. Thus, policies oriented to balance
the e¤ects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
The renewed interest on growth and their determinants has pointed at the …nancial structure as
one of the key factors in the development of nations. This paper introduces a …nancial sector in
one of the more recent models of growth, the one …rst presented in Howitt and Aghion (1998). This
framework allows us to explicitly model how the R&D activity is …nanced by means of contracts
designed to reduce the incidence of researcher’s moral hazard. As a consequence, the …nancial
sector will have real e¤ects on the economy.
Analyzing the interaction between …nancial and economic activity has been the aim of a rather
proli…c literature. The …rst remarkable reference is the work of Schumpeter at the beginning
of the twentieth century. He suggested that …nancial institutions are important for economic
activity because they evaluate and …nance entrepreneurs in their research and development projects.
Similarly, development economists like Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), and McKinnon
(1973) defended the idea that …nancial development encourages growth because it increases the level
of investment and improves its allocation. In addition, they argued that faster growing economies
require higher amounts of …nancial services and that the richer the economy, the sooner it is able
to pay for …nancial superstructures. Unfortunately, a lack of formal analysis is common to all
these papers on development. This is probably because previous to the formulation of a rigorous
framework on the relationship between …nance and growth it was necessary to develop further the
theory of economic growth.1
Neoclassical exogenous growth theory did not o¤er the appropriate frame of reference because
…nancial variables could only have level e¤ects. The appearance of the …rst works on endogenous
growth determined the starting point of the literature on growth and …nance. Classic references
of this …rst line of research are Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991,
1993), Levine (1991, 1992) and Saint Paul (1992). They used the basic Ak framework combined
with credit market models of …nancial intermediation. In these papers, …nancial markets are con-
sidered as institutions intended to provide services of risk pooling and collection of information
about borrowers. They also facilitate the ‡ow of resources from savers to investors in the presence
of market imperfections. Most of the papers on this area introduce several devices to …ght against
adverse selection, moral hazard or liquidity shocks in order to make intermediaries arise endoge-
nously. The role of intermediation is thus, to reduce the ine¢ciency caused by these imperfections.
Consequently, …nancial institutions promote growth because their activity implies a more e¢cient
1This point was already stated by Pagano (1993).
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allocation of resources. With respect to the backward link from growth to …nance suggested by
empirical evidence, they follow the basic argument of earlier work. Namely, that there exists a
…xed component in the cost of …nancial services and that some limit of wealth must be trespassed
before the establishment of a …nancial structure is a¤ordable.
New developments in the theory of economic growth have led to another line of research. Gross-
man and Helpman (1991b) and Romer (1990) suggested that economic growth comes mainly from
the invention and development of new products rather than from the accumulation of physical or
human capital. Recovering the Schumpeterian view of the role of …nancial institutions in economic
activity, some authors tried to explain how …nancing of innovation can a¤ect the growth process.
Good exponents of this literature are King and Levine (1993a), De la Fuente and Marín (1996)
and Blackburn and Hung (1998). Using this new framework they introduce informational fric-
tions in the credit market, providing a rationale for the appearance of intermediaries. King and
Levine consider …nancial intermediaries that act as evaluators of prospective entrepreneurs and as
providers of insurance for innovators. However they do not introduce incentive problems. This
type of problems can arise because risk averse innovators will try to get full insurance. That is,
they will try to get the same payment no matter whether they innovate or not. If this payment is
positive, researchers do not have incentives to innovate, especially, if to innovate they must exert
e¤ort. The papers by De la Fuente and Marín, and Blackburn and Hung take this moral hazard
problem into account though from di¤erent perspectives. The …rst pair of authors provides banks
with an imperfect monitoring technology that reveals the innovator’s level of e¤ort with a certain
probability, while Blackburn and Hung use the costly state veri…cation paradigm, that is, that
innovators have incentives to declare that they have not been successful so as to avoid payment.
At some cost, investors can verify the result of the project. The common message of this group of
papers is that …nancing of innovation is crucial for economic growth, and that the more e¢cient
is the …nancial sector the faster the economy will grow. Concerning the feedback e¤ects of growth
on …nance, these models provide a natural link without recurring to …xed costs assumptions. De
la Fuente and Marín argue that growth causes changes in factor prices which increase the return
to information gathering and hence favor …nancial intermediation activities.
The above growth models used by the latter line of research ignore capital accumulation as a
source of growth. Aghion and Howitt (1998) argue that they ignore capital accumulation because
it is assumed that labor is the only input into research and that labor is inelastically supplied.
Therefore, a rise in capital intensity will have two opposite e¤ects. On one hand, it will make
payo¤s to innovation greater but on the other hand, it will increase labor’s productivity, making
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the input to research more expensive. These two e¤ects cancel each other out so that capital
accumulation leaves innovative activity una¤ected and thus, it cannot in‡uence long run growth.2
However, it is arguable that the only source of growth is innovation and, accordingly, Aghion and
Howitt propose another model of creative destruction with capital accumulation. They assume that
research is produced out of labor and intermediate inputs. In their model, both R&D activities and
capital accumulation determine growth and moreover, they are complementary. Growth cannot go
on forever if there were no innovation because diminishing returns would reduce investment while
without capital accumulation the rising cost of capital would choke o¤ innovation.
This paper explicitly models the contractual relationship between the researcher and the provider
of funds for the project in a model of endogenous technological change in the spirit of Howitt and
Aghion (1998). Financial intermediaries are endowed with a monitoring technology that allows
them to force researchers to exert a higher level of e¤ort than the one they would choose in the ab-
sence of monitoring. Hence, research productivity is determined in the credit market and thus, may
be a¤ected by …nancial variables. In particular, the promotion of …nancial activities will enhance
the economy’s growth performance. That is, subsidies to …nancial intermediation will increase
R&D productivity moving the economy to a faster growing balanced growth path. In addition, a
subsidy to …nancial intermediation may be more e¤ective than a direct subsidy to research. The
latter policy induces a higher research intensity that rises the growth rate. However, the tax change
reduces researchers’ incentives to exert e¤ort, which implies higher monitoring costs and a lower
R&D productivity. This undercuts the positive growth e¤ects of the research subsidy to the point
that for a high enough subsidy rate, the growth e¤ect can become negative.
It is also shown that there exists a negative relationship between the equilibrium level of …nancial
services and capital accumulation. The intuition for this comes from the fact that a policy that
promotes …nancial activity will increase research productivity and thus, reduce the incentives to
accumulate capital due to the business stealing e¤ect.
The e¤ect of …nancial activity on research productivity causes two external e¤ects of opposite
sign. On one hand, its positive e¤ect on the productivity of the research project will spillover
to the other sectors of the economy and it will increase their productivity. On the other hand,
the increase in R&D productivity will raise the arrival rate of innovations and consequently, the
probability that an incumbent producer is replaced by the latest innovator. The higher probability
of being replaced and thus, of losing the ‡ow of pro…ts, discourages capital accumulation. This
is the so-called business stealing e¤ect, or creative destruction process. The interaction of these
2For details see Aghion and Howitt (1998) pages 99-102.
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externalities makes the no-tax equilibrium level of …nancial services ine¢cient. Consequently, there
exists a role for policies aimed at bringing the provision of …nancial services closer to its e¢cient
level.
The paper is divided in 6 sections. Section 2 presents the model, sections 3 and 4 study the
steady state and the dynamics of the system respectively, section 5 performs the welfare analysis
and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
I consider a model of creative destruction with capital accumulation and technological spillovers.3
In the basic model without intermediation, capital accumulation and investment in R&D are the key
variables for long run growth. In the present model however, they are not the only ones. This is due
to the fact that research productivity is no longer an exogenous parameter. It will be determined by
the amount of resources devoted to the …nancial sector of the economy. The availability of …nancial
services increases the success probability of projects and, hence, the productivity of research. Thus,
…nancial activities will also be relevant for the determination of long run growth.
2.1 Consumers
There is a representative consumer who maximizes the present value of utility
V (Ct) =
Z 1
0
ln(Ct)e
¡½tdt: (1)
I use the logarithmic functional form for simplicity. As usual Ct is consumption at date t and ½ is
the rate of discount of consumption.
2.2 Final good sector
The consumption good is produced in a competitive market out of labor and intermediate goods.
Labor is represented by a continuous mass of individuals L; and it is assumed to be inelastically
supplied. Intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of sectors of mass 1, being mit the
supply of sector i at date t: The production function is a Cobb-Douglas with constant returns on
intermediate goods and e¢ciency units of labor
Yt = L
1¡®
Z 1
0
Aitm
®
itdi;
3The growth model is based on the work of Howitt and Aghion (1998).
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where Yt is …nal good production and Ait is the productivity coe¢cient of each sector. I assume
equal factor intensities to simplify calculations.
2.3 Intermediate goods
The intermediate sector has a monopolistic structure. In order to become the monopolist producer
of an intermediate good, the entrepreneur has to buy the patent of the latest version of the product.
This patent gives him the right to produce the good until an innovation occurs and the monopolist
is displaced by the owner of the new technology.
The only input in the production of intermediate goods is capital. In particular, it is assumed
that Ait units of capital are needed to produce one unit of intermediate good i at date t: As we
will see, this assumption is necessary in order to obtain stability. The evolution of each sector’s
productivity coe¢cient; Ait is determined in the research sector.
Capital is hired in a perfectly competitive market at the rental rate ³t: Hence, the cost of one
unit of intermediate good is Ait³t: On the other hand, the equilibrium price of the intermediate
good, p(mit) will be its marginal product
p(mit) = ®L
1¡®Aitm®¡1it ;
wheremit is production of intermediate good i at date t: Thus, the monopolist’s pro…t maximization
problem is the following:
¼it = max
mit
[p(mit)mit ¡Ait³tmit]
s:t: p(mit) = ®L
1¡®Aitm®¡1it ;
from where we obtain the pro…t-maximizing supply and the ‡ow of pro…ts as
mit = L
µ
®2
³t
¶ 1
1¡®
¼it = ®(1¡ ®)L1¡®Aitm®it:
Thanks to the assumption of equal factor intensity, supply of intermediate goods is equal in all
sectors, mit = mt. Thus, the aggregate demand of capital is equal to
R 1
0 Aitmtdi: Let At =
R 1
0 Aitdi;
be the aggregate productivity coe¢cient. Then, equilibrium in the capital market requires demand
to equal supply
Atmt = Kt;
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or equivalently, the ‡ow of intermediate output must be equal to capital intensity kt;
mt =
Kt
At
´ kt:
With this notation we can express the equilibrium rental rate in terms of capital intensity
³t = ®
2L1¡®k®¡1t : (2)
2.4 Research sector
Innovations are produced using the same technology of the …nal good. Hence, it needs physical
capital (embodied in the intermediate goods) apart from labor to be produced. Technology is
assumed to be increasingly complex and hence further innovations will require higher investments.
Accordingly, if Nt is the amount invested in research, the Poisson arrival rate of innovations will be
¸tnt; where nt = NtAmaxt is the productivity adjusted level of research and ¸t is research productivity:
The total amount of investment in research is divided by Amaxt in order to take into account the
e¤ect of increasing technological complexity since Amaxt is the leading edge coe¢cient that represents
the aggregate state of knowledge. We approximate aggregate technological development by the
productivity coe¢cient of the most advanced technology in the economy. When an innovation
occurs, the productivity coe¢cient of that sector jumps discontinuously to Amaxt : The leading edge
coe¢cient grows gradually, at a rate that depends on the aggregate ‡ow of innovations. The
‡ow of pro…ts to a monopolist who started producing at t, ® (1¡ ®)L1¡®Amaxt m®t ; is the payo¤
to innovators if they succeed. Because this payment does not depend on the sector, the level of
research will be the same across sectors and the aggregate ‡ow of innovations is thus ¸tnt:We will
assume that Amaxt grows at a rate proportional to this aggregate ‡ow of innovations
_Amaxt
Amaxt
= ¾¸tnt; ¾ > 0:
It can be proved (see Appendix A) that the long-run cross-sectoral distribution of the relative
productivity parameters, ait = AitAmaxt ; is time invariant and equal to
H(a) = a
1
¾ ; 0 · a · 1: (3)
To simplify, it is assumed that the initial distribution of a is also H(a).
Consider the arbitrage equation of the research sector. This equation establishes the equality
between the expected value of an innovation and its cost. The value of an innovation at t; Vt; must
be the present value of the future ‡ow of pro…ts to the incumbent producer until a new technology
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displaces the monopolist. This ‡ow of pro…ts is (1¡®)®Amaxt L1¡®k®t ; so the present value is given
by
Vt =
Z 1
t
e¡
R ¿
t [rs+¸sns]ds(1¡ ®)®Amaxt L1¡®k®¿ d¿:
The expected marginal revenue of the innovation must equal its marginal cost. The cost of one
unit of research in terms of output is 1. Therefore, since nt = NtAmaxt ; the cost of one unit of research
intensity is Amaxt : I assume that there is a proportional tax on innovation that increases its cost.
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Thus, the marginal cost of increasing research intensity is (1 + ¿n)Amaxt units of output, where ¿n
is the tax to innovative activity. Hence, the research arbitrage condition may be written as
1 + ¿n = ¸t
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸tnt
: (4)
Equation (4) gives the research intensity as a function of capital intensity and the endogenously
determined arrival rate of innovations, ¸t. Thus, the equilibrium level of research is a function of
capital intensity and, indirectly, of …nancial intensity.5
2.5 Capital market
Capital is used as a factor of production in the intermediate goods sector. We have seen that
equilibrium in the capital market requires the rental rate to satisfy equation (2). The owner of a
unit of capital will obtain ³t for it. This amount must be enough to cover the cost of capital. This
includes the rate of interest (rt), the depreciation rate (±), and the tax rate on capital accumulation
(¿k). Hence, the capital market arbitrage equation is
rt + ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®k®¡1t ; (5)
which establishes a decreasing relationship between the interest rate and capital intensity.
2.6 Financing of research
Financial intermediaries channel savings both for its use as capital in production and to …nance
research projects. I assume that each intermediary has access to deposits at the market determined
rate of interest. There is no risk of bankruptcy because they hold a perfectly diversi…ed portfolio
of production loans and research …nancing contracts.
4Perhaps, this is better understood if we consider a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy. The subsidy would reduce the
cost of innovation.
5The arrival rate of innovations, or R&D productivity, is positively related to monitoring intensity.
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No imperfection is introduced in the provision of production loans. However, I will consider
some degree of informational asymmetry in the design of research …nancing contracts. In particular,
I assume that researchers have no funds to invest in the project and, therefore, they have to look for
external …nance. The limited liability constraint implies that there will exist a potential problem
of moral hazard on the part of the researcher. The funds needed for the project will be provided by
intermediaries which are endowed with a monitoring technology that allows them to increase the
e¤ort of the researcher. Moreover, I assume that the intensity with which the intermediary monitors
the researcher determines the additional e¤ort that the former can force the latter to exert, as in
Besanko and Kanatas (1993). It is assumed that there exists a one-to-one relationship between
e¤ort and probability of success. Therefore, the monitoring services of the …nancial intermediaries
determine R&D productivity.
Consider a research project that requires an initial investment of one unit of output and that
will yield a return v with probability ¸: Given the research sector outlined in the previous section,
the return per unit of output invested, v; must be equal to VAmax : The researcher obtains the funds
from the intermediary and in exchange she will pay a …x amount p in case of success and nothing
otherwise.6
The expected pro…ts for the researcher are given by
¸(v ¡ p)¡D(¸);
where D(¸) is the disutility caused by the e¤ort necessary to obtain a probability of success equal
to ¸:We will assume that it takes the following form, which is borrowed from the work of Besanko
and Kanatas (1993):
D(¸) =
¸2
2¯
:
If the researcher received no monitoring at all, the level of e¤ort he would exert would be
¸0 = ¯(v¡ p): This no-monitoring level of e¤ort is implementable at no cost for the intermediary.
However, if the intermediary wishes to impose a higher level of e¤ort, he will have to face a cost
which I assume increasing and convex in the di¤erence between the desired level of e¤ort and ¸0.7
In particular, I assume that in order to obtain a success probability of ¸; the investment required
is given by the following expression:
M(¸¡ ¸0) = (¸¡ ¸0)
2
2s
;
6This is a consequence of the limited liability constraint.
7See Besanko and Kanatas (1993) for details.
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and therefore, the pro…ts of the intermediary can be written as
¦I = ¸p¡ (1 + ¿f )M(¸¡ ¸0)¡ 1;
where ¿f is a tax on the monitoring activities of intermediaries. Notice that imposing taxation on
monitoring activities implies that we are assuming that the monitoring costs of the intermediary are
observable. Thus we are considering moral hazard only on the part of the researcher. This di¤erent
treatment can be justi…ed by the nature of the e¤ort that intermediaries and researchers do. The
disutility caused to the researcher by this e¤ort is non-pecuniary while the monitoring e¤ort of
banks can be measured in monetary units, a feature that makes it easier to observe, especially
when we are talking about …nancial intermediaries, one of the most regulated sectors in developed
economies. Furthermore, we do not require that monitoring costs are observable to depositors but
to the policy maker and to the researcher. In this respect, assuming observability is not as strong
as it would be in other contexts.
There exists a large number of intermediaries that compete in the provision of …nancial services.
A researcher will choose one of them on the basis of his supply of …nancial services since it will
determine the probability of success of her project. However, once the researcher chooses an
intermediary to …nance her project, she will not be able to break this contract and ask another
bank for …nance. This assumption can be justi…ed by the existence of switching costs or by the
reluctancy of research …rms to reveal information about their project. In addition, the fact that
once the choice is made the researcher cannot turn to another intermediary implies that the bank
is placed in a position of power in its relationship with the researcher. In particular, for a given ¸;
the intermediary will be able to impose the payment that maximizes his pro…ts, i.e.
p(v; ¸) = v ¡ ¸ [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]
¯2(1 + ¿f )
: (6)
The fact that the intermediary is able to impose the payment that maximizes his pro…ts does
not mean that the researcher is not going to gain with the contract. Indeed, the nature of the
limited liability constraint implies that the researcher is always going to obtain a positive payment
in expected terms.8 Notice also that this payment scheme implies a negative relationship between
8Recall that the payment is positive in case of success and zero in case of failure, which yields a positive payment
in expected terms. In order to guarantee that the expected payment is positive we have to impose some restrictions
on the parameters. In particular, we require
s <
¯(1 + ¿f )
2
:
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p and ¸: This is optimal for the intermediary because p is positively related to the monitoring
cost of obtaining a given level of e¤ort. Additionally, if the researcher is subject to an intensive
control, she will have to pay less to the intermediary while there is a higher probability that the
project succeeds. This may compensate the researcher for the intensive monitoring. In fact, if
the relationship between p and ¸ is given by (6), the expected pro…ts of the researcher become
monotonically increasing in ¸: Hence, this contract makes monitoring desirable for the researcher,
since it will reduce the share of the intermediary in the project’s return and increase the probability
that the project succeeds. As a consequence, a researcher will choose the intermediary that o¤ers
the highest level of monitoring services. Therefore, no ¸ that implies a positive amount of pro…ts will
be an equilibrium since any intermediary can attract all the researchers by marginally increasing the
degree of monitoring intensity and hence the probability of success. If the number of intermediaries
is su¢ciently large to impede agreements that limit competition, in equilibrium bank pro…ts will
be zero. Therefore, the equilibrium probability of success will be the highest value of ¸ that implies
zero pro…ts. That is, it is the positive root of
¸p(v; ¸)¡ (1 + ¿f )M(¸¡ ¸0(v; p(v; ¸)))¡ 1 = 0
which yields a positive relationship between the productivity of research and the value of the
project, as expressed by
¸ = ~¸(v): (7)
2.7 Equilibrium
Equations (4), (5) and (7) determine partial equilibrium in each market. These equations can be
combined in order to obtain the following equilibrium conditions for each market:
(a) Research market equilibrium
1 + ¿n = ¸t(vt ¡ p(vt; ¸t)): (8)
(b) Capital market equilibrium
rt + ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®k®¡1t : (9)
(c) Credit market equilibrium
¸t = ~¸(vt): (10)
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Notice that the research arbitrage condition has been modi…ed to take into account the payment
to the intermediary.
Equations (6) and (8) imply the following equilibrium expression for ¸:
¸ =
·
¯2(1 + ¿f )(1 + ¿n)
¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s
¸ 1
2
: (11)
Hence, research productivity is time invariant and depends only upon the research and credit
markets’ structural parameters.
Using (11), equation (10) may be written in the following form:
vt =
¸
©(¿f ; ¿n)
;
where
©(¿f ; ¿n) =
2¯2(1 + ¿f )(1 + ¿n)
(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] :
Thus, the system formed by equations (8), (9) and (10) can be reduced to the following system:9
¸ =
·
¯2(1 + ¿f )(1 + ¿n)
¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s
¸ 1
2
:
¸
©(¿f ; ¿n)
=
®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸nt
(12)
rt + ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®k®¡1t ; (13)
which determines the equilibrium values of kt and nt: Notice also that from equations (12) and (13)
one can obtain the equilibrium relationship between nt and kt as given by
nt = n
d(kt) =
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸2
¶
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
1 + ¿n
¡ ®
2L1¡®k®¡1t ¡ ± ¡ ¿k
¸
: (14)
With this equilibrium relationship the model can be reduced to a dynamic system of two
di¤erential equations in capital and consumption. The law of motion of capital is given by
¢
Kt = Yt ¡Ct ¡Nt ¡Et ¡ ±Kt;
where Et is the total amount of resources invested in monitoring. If M(¸¡ ¸0) is the monitoring
cost per unit of output invested in research, then Et must equal M(¸ ¡ ¸0)Nt: Notice that in
9Notice that in equation (12) we are just substituting vt by its expression in equilibrium.
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equilibriumM(¸¡¸0) is a constant. Thus, in order to simplify, let us denote it by e =M(¸¡¸0) =
s(1+¿n)
2(1+¿f)[¯(1+¿f)¡s] so that Et will be equal to eNt:
The law of motion for consumption comes from utility maximization
¢
Ct = (rt ¡ ½)Ct:
In order to obtain a system with steady state, express all variables in terms of e¢ciency units 10
¢
kt = L
1¡®k®t ¡ ct ¡ (1 + ¾)(1 + e)nt ¡ (± + gt)kt (15)
¢
ct = (rt ¡ ½¡ gt)ct; (16)
and substitute the equilibrium expressions for rt; gt and nt in equations (15) and (16) to express
the system in terms of capital intensity and consumption per e¢ciency unit
¢
kt = L
1¡®k®t ¡ ct ¡ (1 + ¾)(1 + e)nd(kt)¡ (± + gd(kt))kt
¢
ct = (®
2L1¡®k®¡1t ¡ ± ¡ ¿k ¡ ½¡ gd(kt))ct:
where
gd(kt) = ¾¸n
d(kt):
Due to the non-linearity of the system it must be linearized around the steady state in order to
analyze the local dynamics. Accordingly, we will study the system at the steady state in the next
section.
3 Steady State Analysis
In a steady state all variables grow at a constant rate. If we substitute the equilibrium values
mit = kt =
Kt
At
in the aggregate production function, we obtain the usual Cobb-Douglas functional
form at the aggregate level
Yt = (AtL)
1¡®K®t :
10Note that
At =
Z 1
0
Aitdi = A
max
t
Z 1
0
Ait
Amaxt
di = Amaxt
Z 1
0
ah(a)da = Amaxt E(a) =
Amaxt
1 + ¾
:
Therefore, NtAt =
(1+¾)Nt
Amaxt
= (1 + ¾)nt:
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This expression implies that the rate of growth of output will be that of the aggregate productivity
coe¢cient and, given that At is proportional to the leading edge coe¢cient, the growth rate of the
economy will be
g = ¾¸n;
where ¸ and n are constant and determined jointly with k through the equilibrium conditions of
research, capital and credit markets.11 These conditions, evaluated at the steady state, are the
following:
¸
©
=
®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®
½+ (1 + ¾)¸n
½+ ¾¸n+ ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®k®¡1 (17)
¸ =
·
¯2(1 + ¿f )(1 + ¿n)
¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s
¸ 1
2
;
from where we obtain
n =
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸2
¶
®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®
(1 + ¾)
¡ ½
(1 + ¾)¸
; (18)
and the equation that implicitly determines the steady state value of k; which is the result of
plugging (18) into (17)
F (k) =
½
(1 + ¾)
+
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸
¶
¾®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®
(1 + ¾)
+ ± + ¿k ¡ ®2L1¡®k®¡1 = 0: (19)
The steady state growth rate can be expressed in terms of capital intensity using equation (17)
to obtain
g = ®2L1¡®k®¡1 ¡ ½¡ ± ¡ ¿k:
The use of implicit di¤erentiation allows us to analyze the e¤ect on k of parameter changes, and
to obtain the following comparative statics results:
Proposition 1 The steady state growth rate increases with subsidies to capital accumulation and
to …nancial activity. The growth rate is increasing (decreasing) in ¿n when ¿n > ¡ s2¯(1+¿f )¡s³
¿n < ¡ s2¯(1+¿f )¡s
´
:
11Variables without time suscript denote steady state values.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 The steady state growth rate is increasing in ¾ (the size of innovations); decreasing
in ½ and ± and increasing in s (the scale parameter of the monitoring costs) and ¯ (the scale
parameter of the disutility of e¤ort).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes a marginal positive relation between …nancial activity and growth.
This relation may be understood because a subsidy to …nancial activity (or equivalently a reduction
in ¿f ) implies a lower monitoring cost. Thus, monitoring intensity increases. Accordingly, the
positive growth e¤ect of this policy is due to the externality that …nancial activity causes on
the accumulation of public knowledge. Promoting …nancial activity is equivalent to increase the
productivity of R&D and thus, to make a better use of the resources allocated to research.
The result obtained for the growth e¤ects of research subsidies re‡ects the moral hazard problem
of R&D. The smaller cost of research represents an increase of the expected return for researchers
that does not depend on the e¤ort they exert. It can be shown that a lower ¿n reduces the no
monitoring level of e¤ort.12 This implies a higher monitoring cost and, thus, ¸ falls. Therefore,
even though we expect a positive e¤ect on research intensity, the R&D productivity reduction may
be enough to cause a negative e¤ect on the growth rate.
Aghion and Howitt (1998) argue that capital accumulation and innovation are complementary
factors for long run growth. To illustrate this assertion, they reduce the capital tax, a measure that
directly a¤ects the capital market, and study the reaction of the economy. The reduction of the
cost of capital rises the equilibrium value of capital intensity making the ‡ow of pro…ts accruing
to a successful innovator grow. Consequently, investment in the research sector will increase.
Thus a policy that directly favors capital accumulation also incentives innovation and economic
growth. The same argument can be applied in the present model. Therefore, innovation and
capital accumulation continue being complementary factors for long run growth. Furthermore, this
policy has no negative e¤ects either on ¸0 or on ¸: Thus, a subsidy to capital accumulation may
be preferable in terms of growth to a direct subsidy to research.
12The equilibrium expression for ¸0 is given by
¸0 =
·
(1 + ¿n) [¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s]
(1 + ¿f )
¸ 1
2
: (20)
Thus, the result follows immediately.
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We can perform the same experiment on …nancial activity. Thus, let us reduce the …nancial tax.
The lower monitoring cost stimulates the production of …nancial services, inducing a rise in the
arrival rate of innovations and, consequently, a larger rate of creative destruction. This discourages
capital investment because the incumbent monopolist faces a larger probability of being replaced.
Thus, the e¤ect on capital accumulation is negative. That is, a policy that incentives …nancial
activity will make the economy grow faster even though it will discourage capital investment.
Therefore, capital and …nancial intensity should be considered substitutive factors for long run
growth. Notice that this negative e¤ect of research …nancing on capital accumulation undercuts
the growth e¤ects of intermediation promoting policies.
At the no-tax equilibrium a marginal reduction of any of the three taxes would increase the
growth rate. In order to identify the most e¤ective policy, the tax changes are made equivalent in
terms of the amount of resources generated for the government budget. The budget constraint of
the government is given by
¿nNt + ¿kKt + ¿fEt = T;
where T is the lump-sum transference or tax used to balance the budget when we introduce a policy
change. In order to make two policy changes equivalent, the change induced on T must be the
same. Therefore, to compare the growth e¤ects of ¿k; ¿f and ¿n; we must compare the following
expressions: ¯¯¯¯
dg
dT
¯¯¯¯
dT=Ktd¿k
¿f=¿k=¿n=0
=
dg
d¿k
d¿k
dT
=
dg
d¿k
1
Kt
¯¯¯¯
dg
dT
¯¯¯¯
dT=Etd¿f
¿f=¿k=¿n=0
=
dg
d¿f
d¿f
dT
=
dg
d¿f
1
Et
¯¯¯¯
dg
dT
¯¯¯¯
dT=Ntd¿n
¿f=¿k=¿n=0
=
dg
d¿n
d¿n
dT
=
dg
d¿n
1
Nt
;
which allow us to establish the following propositions:
Proposition 3 At the no-tax equilibrium, the growth e¤ect of ¿f is stronger than the growth e¤ect
of ¿n; i.e.,
dg
d¿f
1
Et
< dgd¿n
1
Nt
:
Proof. See Appendix.
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Proposition 4 At the no-tax equilibrium, the growth e¤ect of ¿f is stronger than the growth e¤ect
of ¿k; i.e.
dg
d¿f
1
Et
< dgd¿k
1
Kt
; whenever
® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k® < ¸
©
µ
2 [¯ ¡ s]
s
¶
½: (21)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that, at the no-tax equilibrium, subsidizing the …nancial sector will be
more growth promoting than directly subsidizing research. Similarly, Proposition 4 implies that
the …nancial tax may have larger e¤ects on growth than the capital tax. Therefore, there exist
situations in which subsidizing …nancial activity is the most e¤ective policy in order to improve
the growth performance of the economy. Notice that in the case of Proposition 4, condition (21) is
expressed in terms of k which is an endogenous variable. Consequently, it could happen that the
condition is never satis…ed. However, by means of calibration, it is relatively easy to …nd sets of
parameters for which the condition is satis…ed. Notice also that the e¤ectiveness of the …nancial
tax depends upon s; the scale parameter for monitoring costs. A small s means a large monitoring
cost and a low monitoring intensity, e. Therefore, the lower the s, the smaller the relative amount
of resources allocated to …nancial services in equilibrium and the stronger the marginal e¤ect we
can induce on monitoring intensity. To sum up, this result proposes the use of subsidies or tax cuts
to …nancial activity as an alternative instrument to promote innovation without the moral hazard
problems of direct research subsidies.
4 Dynamics
After analyzing the behavior of the economy at its long run equilibrium, the system can now be
linearized so as to study the dynamics of the model around the steady state. Recall that the system
is formed by the following equations:
¢
kt = L
1¡®k®t ¡ ct ¡ (1 + ¾)(1 + e)nd(kt)¡ (± + gd(kt))kt
¢
ct = (®
2L1¡®k®¡1t ¡ ± ¡ ¿k ¡ ½¡ gd(kt))ct:
The linearized system is obtained computing the Jacobian of the system and evaluating it at the
steady state. In order to simplify notation let us express the system as follows
¢
kt = '(kt; ct; ¿k; ¿f ; ¿n)
¢
ct = Á(kt; ct; ¿k; ¿f ; ¿n):
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Then the derivatives needed are the following:
'k (k; c) = ®L
1¡®k®¡1 ¡ (1 + ¾)(1 + e)nd0(kt)¡ (± + g)¡ k(gd0(k))
'c (k; c) = ¡1
Ák (k; c) = c(¡®2(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡2 ¡ g0d(k))
Ác (k; c) = 0:
With this notation the linearized system will be
¢
kt = 'k (k; c) (kt ¡ k)¡ (ct ¡ c)
¢
ct = Ák (k; c) (kt ¡ k):
The determinant of the matrix of the system is equal to the function Ák (k; c) evaluated at the
steady state, which can be proved to be negative. Therefore the system presents local saddle path
stability. For future reference, let ¸1 be the negative eigenvalue and ¸2 the positive one.
5 Welfare analysis
Now that we have characterized the dynamics of the system we can analyze the welfare implications
of changes in tax parameters.
From equation (1) we can express utility at the steady state in terms of the stationary level of
consumption and the long-run growth rate
Vs(c; g) =
Z 1
0
ln(cAt)e
¡½tdt =
ln(cA0)
½
+
g
½2
:
The change in steady state welfare is a combination of the change in steady state consumption and
the change in steady state growth
@Vs(c; g)
@¿ i
=
1
½c
@c
@¿ i
+
1
½2
@g
@¿ i
for i = k; f; n: (22)
This measure of welfare is valid to compare two situations of long run equilibrium. However, it
does not consider the periods of transition during which the economy moves from one equilibrium
to another. In order to re‡ect the transition we must analyze the e¤ect on lifetime utility. Rewrite
equation (1) to obtain the following expression for lifetime utility as a function of the di¤erent tax
rates (¿ i where i = k; f; n:):
V (¿ i) =
ln(A0)
½
+
Z 1
0
·Z t
0
gs(¿ i)ds
¸
e¡½tdt+
Z 1
0
ln(ct(¿ i))e
¡½tdt
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where gt(¿ i) and ct(¿ i) are the time paths of the growth rate and the level of consumption per
e¢ciency unit after a change in one of the tax parameters. The e¤ect on utility will thus be given
by the e¤ects on the paths of growth and consumption. I will obtain …rst the e¤ect on the paths
of consumption and capital intensity and then use the latter to get the e¤ect on the path of the
growth rate.
Let c = p(k; ¿ i) be the saddle path of the system which can be interpreted as the graph of a
policy function relating consumption and capital. Then, we know that its slope pk; is positive and
equal to Ák¸1 : Substituting the policy function into the law of motion of k; the equilibrium dynamics
of the system can be characterized by a single di¤erential equation which describes the evolution
of the state variable along the stable manifold.
_k = '(k; c) = '(k; p(k; ¿ i)) = ª(k; ¿ i):
The solution to this equation, kt(¿ i), gives the equilibrium value of k as a function of time and the
tax parameter: Using kt(¿ i) in the policy function we would obtain the time path of c
ct(¿ i) = p(kt(¿ i); ¿ i):
To calculate the change in welfare we need the derivative of the whole time path of c with respect
to ¿ i
dct(¿ i)
d¿ i
= pk
dkt(¿ i)
d¿ i
+ p¿ i ; (23)
where p¿ i is the derivative of the policy function with respect to the tax or graphically, the shift in
the saddle path caused by the policy change.
In order to compute dkt(¿ i)d¿ i ; notice that kt(¿ i) = k(t; ¿ i) must satisfy identically the original
equation
_k(t; ¿ i) ´ ' (p(k(t; ¿ i); ¿ i); k(t; ¿ i); ¿ i) ;
di¤erentiate both sides with respect to ¿ i
_k¿ i =
dk¿ i
dt
= ['cpk + 'k] k¿ i + 'cp¿ i + '¿ i :
Hence k¿ i satis…es a linear di¤erential equation. Moreover, when we start from a steady state, the
coe¢cients of this equation are constant and we can write
_k¿ i = ¸1k¿ i ¡ p¿ i + '¿ i :
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The general solution is given by
k¿ i(t) = exp (¸1t) k¿ i(0) + (1¡ exp (¸1t))k¿ i(1):
Since k is a predetermined variable, the change at the date of the policy change k¿i(0) must be
zero. The long run e¤ect, k¿ i(1) = limt!1 k¿ i(t); is in fact the derivative of the steady state value
of k with respect to the tax parameter, and can be expressed as
k¿ i(1) =
p¿ i ¡ '¿ i
¸1
:
The equilibrium time path of the derivative of k with respect to ¿ i is thus given by
k¿ i(t) = (1¡ exp(¸1t))
·
p¿ i ¡ '¿ i
¸1
¸
;
that is, k will gradually reach its new steady state value at a rate equal to the negative eigenvalue.
Substitute now in equation (23) to obtain the …nal expression for the derivative of the time
path of consumption with respect to the tax parameter
dct(¿ i)
d¿ i
= pk(1¡ exp(¸1t))
·
p¿ i ¡ '¿ i
¸1
¸
+ p¿ i :
As before, we can identify the immediate change and the long run e¤ect
dc0(¿ i)
d¿ i
= p¿ i ;
dc1(¿ i)
d¿ i
= pk
·
p¿ i ¡ '¿ i
¸1
¸
+ p¿ i ;
where the …rst represents the necessary jump of consumption to get on the new saddle path and
the second is the e¤ect on the steady state value of consumption. Thus, consumption will initially
jump to the new saddle path and then it will approach its new steady state value at a rate equal
to ¸1:
The derivative of the growth rate and consumption per e¢ciency unit at date t are given by
dgt(¿ i)
d¿ i
=
dgd(k)
dk
(1¡ exp(¸1t)) @k
@¿ i
+
@gd(k)
@¿ i
(24)
dct(¿ i)
d¿ i
=
@c
@¿ i
¡ pk exp(¸1t) @k
@¿ i
: (25)
Notice that the derivatives of gd are evaluated at the steady state because we consider the stationary
equilibrium as the situation before the tax change.
Expressions (24) and (25) allow us to write the change in welfare as follows:
@V (¿ i)
@¿ i
=
@Vs(¿ i)
@¿ i
+
24 ½¡¸1½ dgd(k)dk + (1¡®)³k
¸1 (½¡ ¸1)
35 @k
@¿ i
: (26)
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Equations (22) and (26) give the general expressions for the e¤ect of the three taxes on the di¤erent
measures of welfare. Let us see now the speci…c results for each policy.
5.1 Tax on capital
The e¤ect on welfare of the capital tax is given by
@Vs(c; g)
@¿k
=
1
½c
@c
@¿k
+
1
½2
@g
@¿k
@V (c; g)
@¿k
=
@Vs(c; g)
@¿k
+
24
³
½¡¸1
½
´
dgd(k)
dk +
(1¡®)³
k
¸1 (½¡ ¸1)
35 @k
@¿k
; (27)
where the …rst expression represents the e¤ect on welfare if the transition is excluded. Both the
expression in square brackets in equation (27) and @k@¿k are negative. Therefore, the e¤ect on welfare
using the second measure will always be larger than the e¤ect if we use the …rst measure.
Proposition 1 shows that @g@¿k is negative. However, the e¤ect on consumption is ambiguous.
The derivative of consumption with respect to the capital tax is given by
@c
@¿k
=
k
1 + ©¸
³
¾
1+¾
´
k
µ
¡ 1
®
+
(1 + e)©
¸2
¡ ½+ ¿k
(1¡ ®) ³ +
©
¸
µ
¾
1 + ¾
¶
k
¶
:
The functional form of this derivative implies that for large enough values of steady state capital
intensity; the derivative will be positive while it may be negative for smaller values of k: Since the
relationship between k and the capital tax is negative, this suggests that for negative or small values
of ¿k we might expect a positive e¤ect on consumption while for large values of the tax, @c@¿k may
become negative. Therefore, we may roughly represent the relationship between consumption and
the capital tax as an inverted U-shaped curve whose maximum shifts right or left depending on the
structural characteristics of the economy. In summary, there may exist a consumption maximizing
value of ¿k but whether it is a subsidy or a tax depends upon the economy considered. These
results can also be applied to the relationship between welfare and this tax. I have calibrated the
model for a usually accepted set of parameters obtaining that in every case, the welfare maximizing
rate of this policy instrument was a subsidy.13 Consequently, in economies with a positive capital
tax rate, a tax reduction will generally cause a welfare improvement.
13The set of parameters used includes ½ = 0:02; ± = 0:05; ¾ = ln(1:1) and L = 1: The values of ¯ and s were chosen
so that the resulting steady state values of the growth rate and the probability of success lay in a reasonable interval.
The computer program used for calibration is available upon request.
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5.2 Tax on …nancial services
The welfare derivatives for the …nancial tax are
@Vs(c; g)
@¿f
=
1
½c
@c
@¿f
+
1
½2
@g
@¿f
@V (c; g)
@¿f
=
@Vs(c; g)
@¿f
+
24
³
½¡¸1
½
´
dgd(k)
dk +
(1¡®)³
k
¸1 (½¡ ¸1)
35 @k
@¿f
;
and given that @k@¿f is positive, the e¤ect on welfare of this tax will always be smaller if we consider
the transition.
As before, we know that the derivative of the growth rate with respect to this tax is negative.
The e¤ect on consumption is given by
@c
@¿f
= (1¡ ®) ³ @k
@¿f
µ
1 + ®
®
¡ (1 + e)©
¸2
+
½+ ¿k
(1¡ ®) ³
¶
+
+
·
¡ @
@¿f
©(1 + e)
¸2
¸
® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k® + ½
·
@
@¿f
1 + e
¸
¸
: (28)
In order to simplify the analysis, the range of values of the tax parameters is restricted so that we
can give an unambiguous sign to this derivative. To this end, we will not consider values of the
capital tax rate below ¡½ nor subsidy rates to the research sector above 57 : Under these assumptions,
we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If ¿k > ¡½ and ¿n > ¡57 ; the derivative of steady state consumption per e¢ciency
unit with respect to the …nancial tax is positive.
Proof. See Appendix
Consequently, a marginal change in the …nancial tax will cause opposite e¤ects on growth and
consumption, depending the …nal welfare change on which e¤ect dominates. Obviously, the value
of the discount rate is determinant for the sign of @Vs(c;g)@¿f : This derivative will be positive whenever
@c
@¿f
+ c½
@g
@¿f
is positive. A small ½ means that consumers weight more heavily the growth e¤ect of
the tax. Thus, if ½ is small enough, welfare will increase with reductions of the …nancial tax. Notice
also that for a given discount rate, increases in ¿f make steady state consumption per e¢ciency
unit grow. Therefore, we may expect positive e¤ects on welfare for low values of the tax though
they may disappear as the tax rate increases. Hence, we also …nd the inverted U-shaped curve
representing the relationship between welfare and the …nancial tax.
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A calibration of the model gives a rough idea of how can …nancial policies improve welfare.
At the no tax equilibrium and for the same set of parameters used before, I obtain the following
results:
Table 1
Calibration for ½ = 0:02 at the no-tax equilibrium.
® @Vs@¿f
@V
@¿f
0.80 -0.014 -0.031
0.75 -0.010 -0.023
0.70 -0.005 -0.015
0.65 -0.002 -0.007
0.60 0.001 -0.002
0.55 0.004 0.002
0.50 0.005 0.004
0.45 0.005 0.005
0.40 0.005 0.005
0.35 0.003 0.003
A negative sign of the welfare derivative means that the optimal policy is to reduce the …nancial
tax. Conversely, a positive entry implies that the optimal policy is a tax increase. This calibration
suggests that …nancial services will be underprovided in a relatively capital intensive economy while
in less capital intensive economies, a reduction of its provision could increase welfare. Recall that
the …nancial sector has real e¤ects on the economy only because it can modify the productivity
of research. A high ® means a relatively high equilibrium value of k which in turn implies a high
research intensity. Therefore, a policy that favors monitoring and thus, increases the productivity
of research, will have larger growth e¤ects in an economy with a relatively higher research intensity.
This larger growth e¤ect will be able to compensate for the reduction in steady state consumption
per e¢ciency unit. On the contrary, if ® is small, so is equilibrium research intensity and thus, the
higher productivity in this case will not be able to induce a large enough increase in the growth
rate.
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5.3 Tax on research activity
The welfare derivatives for the research tax are
@Vs(c; g)
@¿n
=
1
½c
@c
@¿n
+
1
½2
@g
@¿n
@V (c; g)
@¿n
=
@Vs(c; g)
@¿n
+
24 ½¡¸1½ dgd(k)dk + (1¡®)³k
¸1 (½¡ ¸1)
35 @k
@¿n
;
and as with the …nancial tax, the fact that @k@¿n is positive makes the e¤ect on welfare of this tax
smaller if we consider the transition.
The derivative of steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit is given by the following expres-
sion:
@c
@¿n
= (1¡ ®) ³ @k
@¿n
µ
1 + ®
®
¡ (1 + e)©
¸2
+
½+ ¿k
(1¡ ®) ³
¶
+
+
·
¡ @
@¿n
©(1 + e)
¸2
¸
® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k® + ½
·
@
@¿n
1 + e
¸
¸
:
The e¤ect of the research tax on consumption is established in the next proposition:
Proposition 6 If ¿n > ¡ s2¯(1+¿f)¡s and ¿k > ¡½; the derivative of steady state consumption per
e¢ciency unit with respect to the research tax is positive.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given that the e¤ect on growth of this tax is negative, the …nal e¤ect on welfare will depend
upon the discount rate.14 As with the …nancial tax, if ½ is small enough, welfare may increase with
a reduction of research taxation. In general though, we expect the typical inverted-U relationship
in the sense that increases of the research tax may initially improve welfare though further increases
could …nally harm it.
If the government were considering whether to subsidize the research or the …nancial sector,
we know that the …nancial tax will have larger e¤ects on growth and in this sense it would be
preferable.15 However, we must consider also the e¤ect on consumption. We would like to have
14 I will restrict the rest of the welfare analysis of this tax to ¿n > ¡ s
2¯(1+¿f )¡s
; because the sign of the derivative
of consumption for smaller values of ¿n is ambiguous.
15 In what follows, I assume that the initial situation is the no-tax equilibrium. Therefore, the e¤ect on growth of
the two subsidies is positive being the …nancial tax more e¤ective.
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the result that the e¤ect on consumption of the …nancial subsidy is smaller since consumption will
be reduced. However, we …nd the opposite result. That is, a …nancial subsidy will cause a larger
reduction in steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit than a research subsidy. Consequently,
whether one policy is preferable to the other in terms of welfare will depend upon the discount rate
of the economy. A calibration of the model for ½ = 0:02; yields the following results:
Table 2
Welfare e¤ects of ¿f and ¿n
® @Vs@¿f
1
e
@Vs
@¿n
@V
@¿f
1
e
@V
@¿n
0.80 ¡14:0 5.7 ¡30:9 5.7
0.75 ¡10:0 5.4 ¡22:9 5.4
0.70 ¡5:0 5.1 ¡15:0 5.1
0.65 ¡2:0 4.8 ¡7:5 4.8
0.60 1:0 4.3 ¡1:6 4.3
0.55 4:0 3.8 2:4 3.8
0.50 5:0 3.1 4:6 3.1
0.45 5:0 2.4 5:2 2.4
0.40 5:0 1.6 4:7 1.6
0.35 3:0 0.8 3:3 0.8
Notice that the sign of the welfare derivative with respect to the research tax is positive in every
case. This means that a subsidy (a marginal reduction of the tax) would reduce welfare. In other
words, the positive growth e¤ect is not enough to compensate for the negative e¤ect on steady
state consumption per e¢ciency unit. Therefore, if the government wishes to increase welfare, the
appropriate policy is a research tax increase. With respect to the other policy instrument, the
…nancial tax, the e¤ect on welfare of the latter is larger when ® is either very large or very small.
Thus, if we consider ® = 0:75 as a proxy for the capital intensity of a developed economy, a policy
that promotes the …nancing of research projects by intermediaries dominates a direct subsidy to
research both in terms of growth and welfare.
6 Conclusions
Innovation is nowadays recognized as one of the most important factors of economic growth. How-
ever, the presence of informational asymmetries and the di¢cult appropriation of R&D’s external
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e¤ects cause ine¢ciencies that may reduce the private production of innovation. This paper anal-
yses the consequences on economic growth of the activity of …nancial intermediaries that try to
reduce the incidence of moral hazard on research. There exists moral hazard because in the ab-
sence of monitoring, researchers choose the amount of e¤ort that maximizes their expected utility,
a smaller level of e¤ort than the one that would maximize the expected value of the project. The
no-monitoring level of e¤ort is smaller because the researcher receives only a part of the value of
the innovation while the rest goes to the intermediary. However, the intermediary is provided with
a monitoring technology that enables him to impose a higher e¤ort. The monitoring intensity will
determine the amount of e¤ort a¤ordable and the probability of success of the research project.
This paper shows that a policy that incentives monitoring is able to improve the growth perfor-
mance of the economy due to its positive e¤ect on R&D productivity. Furthermore, it is shown
that directly subsidizing research may reduce the growth rate of the economy. The negative e¤ect
on growth of a research subsidy may appear because it accentuates the incidence of moral hazard.
As a consequence, this paper proposes subsidies to capital accumulation and to …nancial activity as
alternative growth promoting policies. The advantage of these policies with respect to the research
subsidy is that they do not see their e¤ects undercut by a reduction of R&D productivity.
A subsidy to …nancial activity increases the growth rate of the economy. However, its e¤ect
on steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit is negative. Therefore, the actual value of the
discount rate will determine the sign of the welfare e¤ect in each case. Nevertheless, for a typical
value of the discount rate, it is obtained that …nancial services will be underprovided in relatively
capital intensive economies while they will be overprovided in less capital intensive economies. This
may be due to the interaction of two externalities of opposite sign. On the one hand, the positive
e¤ect of …nancial activities on R&D productivity makes the whole economy more productive since
the growth rate of aggregate productivity depends positively on the arrival rate of innovations.
However, the magnitude of this positive e¤ect depends upon the relative importance of the research
sector which in turn is determined by capital intensity. Thus, the more capital intensive the
economy, the greater this e¤ect will be. On the other hand, a higher probability of success due to
a more intense monitoring implies a higher probability of replacement for the incumbent producer.
This discourages capital accumulation. Whether the reduction in the equilibrium level of capital
causes a large or a small e¤ect depends upon the initial situation of the economy. If capital
intensity was relatively low, the initial equilibrium level of capital is relatively small and a further
reduction will have large negative e¤ects on the economy. On the contrary, if the economy was in
an equilibrium with a large level of capital per e¢ciency unit, a reduction will not represent a big
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damage. Thus, the positive externality is stronger when capital intensity is high, while the negative
externality has larger e¤ects when the economy is less capital intensive. Therefore, policies aimed
at balancing the e¤ects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.
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A Proofs of propositions
Proof that H(a) is the limiting distribution of relative productivities.
(Adapted from Aghion and Howitt (1998))
Let F (¢; t) denote the cumulative distribution of the absolute productivity parameters, A; across
sectors at date t: Pick any A > 0 and let it be the leading edge coe¢cient at t0 ¸ 0: De…ne
©(t) = F (A; t): Then
©(t0) = 1
d©(t)
dt
= ¡©(t)¸tnt for all t ¸ t0: (29)
Equation (29) gives the rate at which the fraction of sectors with a productivity coe¢cient smaller
than A falls. This rate is given by the ‡ow of innovations occurred in the sectors behind A; i.e.
©(t)¸tnt: The solution to this di¤erential equation is
©(t) = e
¡ R t
t0
¸snsds for all t ¸ t0:
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Recall that
dAmaxt
dt
= ¾Amaxt ¸tnt
and that A = Amaxt0 ; therefore
A
Amaxt
= e
¡¾ R tt0 ¸snsds;
or equivalently
©(t) =
µ
A
Amaxt
¶ 1
¾
:
De…ne a to be the relative productivity AAmaxt : By construction, ©(t) is the fraction of sectors in
which the productivity coe¢cient is less than A: Hence, the last equation establishes that this
fraction is given by equation (3) at date t if a is the relative productivity at t of a sector that
innovated on or after date t0: If t is large enough, this will include almost all values of a between
0 and 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. The signs of the derivatives of the growth rate depend upon the
signs of the derivatives of the steady state capital intensity. Consider equation (19) which de…nes
the steady state values of k. Straightforward di¤erentiation yields
@F (k)
@k
= ®2(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡2
·
1 +
¾
(1 + ¾)
©
¸
k
¸
@F (k)
@¿k
= 1
@F (k)
@¿f
=
@
@¿f
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸
¶
¾®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®
(1 + ¾)
@F (k)
@¿n
=
@
@¿n
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸
¶
¾®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®
(1 + ¾)
; (30)
where
@
@¿f
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸
¶
=
©e
¸(1 + ¿n)
(1 + ¿n) s¡ 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]
(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] ;
expression which is negative for the range of values assumed for the parameters. The sign of the
derivative in (30) depends upon @@¿n
³
©(¿f ;¿n)
¸
´
given by
@
@¿n
µ
©(¿ f ; ¿n)
¸
¶
=
µ
©
2¸(1 + ¿n)
¶
2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]¡ (1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿ f )¡ s]
(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿ f )¡ s] :
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This derivative is negative if and only if ¿n > ¡ s2¯(1+¿f )¡s : Therefore,
@k
@¿k
= ¡
@F (k)
@¿k
@F (k)
@k
< 0;
@k
@¿f
= ¡
@F (k)
@¿f
@F (k)
@k
> 0;
@k
@¿n
= ¡
@F (k)
@¿n
@F (k)
@k
¸ 0 for ¿n ¸ ¡ s
2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s and
@k
@¿n
= ¡
@F (k)
@¿n
@F (k)
@k
< 0 for ¿n < ¡ s
2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s:
Given the signs of the derivatives of k with respect to the di¤erent taxes, the e¤ects on growth can
be obtained recalling that the following equation must hold in equilibrium:
g = ®2L1¡®k®¡1 ¡ ½¡ ± ¡ ¿k:
Consequently, the derivative of the growth rate with respect to the capital tax is given by
@g
@¿k
= ¡ (1¡ ®)®2L1¡®k®¡2 @k
@¿k
¡ 1;
or equivalently
@g
@¿k
=
¡
³
¾
1+¾
´
©(¿f ;¿n)
¸ kh
1 +
³
¾
1+¾
´
©(¿f ;¿n)
¸ k
i ;
which is unambiguously negative. Therefore, the growth rate depends negatively on the capital tax
and thus, a subsidy increase or a reduction of the tax would enhance growth.
The derivatives of the growth rate with respect to the …nancial tax and to the innovation tax
are
@g
@¿f
= ¡(1¡ ®)®2L1¡®k®¡2 @k
@¿f
;
and
@g
@¿n
= ¡(1¡ ®)®2L1¡®k®¡2 @k
@¿n
:
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Given the signs of the derivatives of k we have previously obtained, the corresponding results of
Proposition 1 follow.
Proof of Proposition 2. The derivative of k with respect to ¾ is given by the following
expression:
@k
@¾
=
¡¸n
(1 + ¾)®2(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡2
h
1 + ¾(1+¾)
©(¿f ;¿n)
¸ k
i ;
which is negative. Thus, capital intensity at the steady state is negatively related to ¾. In conse-
quence, the derivative of g with respect to ¾ is positive.
The other two results are immediate since the derivative of g with respect to ± is equal to the
derivative with respect to ¿k and the derivative of k with respect to ½ satis…es
@k
@½
=
µ
1
1 + ¾
¶
@k
@¿k
:
Therefore, if the derivative of g with respect to ¿k is negative, so is the derivative of g with respect
to ½:
Regarding the e¤ect on the growth rate of changes in s and ¯; notice that
@F (k)
@s
=
µ
¾®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®
1 + ¾
¶
@
¡
©
¸
¢
@s
;
and
@F (k)
@¯
=
µ
¾®(1¡ ®)L1¡®k®
1 + ¾
¶
@
¡
©
¸
¢
@¯
;
where
@
@s
µ
©
¸
¶
=
µ
©
¸
¶
[2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ (3 + ¿n)s]
2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] [(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]]
@
@¯
µ
©
¸
¶
=
µ
©
¸¯
¶ [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ 2s] + (1 + ¿n) [¯(1+¿f )[2¯(1+¿f )¡3s]+2s2]2[¯(1+¿f )¡s]
[(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]] ;
are both positive. Therefore, @F (k)@s and
@F (k)
@¯ are also positive, which implies that
@k
@s and
@k
@¯ are
negative. Therefore, the derivatives of the growth rate with respect to these parameters are both
positive.
Proof of Proposition 3. dgd¿f
1
Et
< dgd¿n
1
Nt
holds if and only if dgd¿f
1
e <
dg
d¿n
: At the no tax
equilibrium this inequality is given by the following expression:
¡(1¡ ®)®
2L1¡®k®¡2
e
@k
@¿f
< ¡(1¡ ®)®2L1¡®k®¡2 @k
@¿n
;
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or equivalently
1
e
@k
@¿f
>
@k
@¿n
:
This inequality holds whenever
1
e
@
@¿f
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸
¶
<
@
@¿n
µ
©(¿f ; ¿n)
¸
¶
:
Evaluating both derivatives at the no-tax equilibrium and simplifying we obtain that the condition
for the inequality to hold is
s <
4
7
¯:
The parameters involved in the last expression (s and ¯) must be positive and satisfy the following
condition:
s <
¯
2
(1 + ¿f );
which is necessary to guarantee a positive expected value of the project for the researcher. There-
fore, at the no-tax equilibrium, the growth e¤ect of ¿f is larger than the growth e¤ect of ¿n:
Proof of Proposition 4. The growth e¤ect of ¿f is larger in absolute value than the
growth e¤ect of ¿k when
dg
d¿f
1
Et
< dgd¿k
1
Kt
which at the steady state is equivalent to require that
dg
d¿f
1
(1+¾)en <
dg
d¿k
1
k : Evaluating both derivatives at the no-tax equilibrium and simplifying yields
the desired expression, i.e., ® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k® < ¸© 2[¯¡s]s ½:
Proof of Proposition 5. The derivative of c with respect to ¿f is given by equation (28).
In order to obtain positive values of steady state consumption, we assume that the parameters are
such that 1+®® ¡ (1+e)©¸2 > 0: Under this assumption, the …rst term of this expression is positive
and so is the second. However, the last term may be positive or negative depending on the actual
values of ¿f and ¿n: Nevertheless, from equation (14) we can express this derivative as follows:
@c
@¿f
= (1¡ ®) ³ @k
@¿f
µ
1 + ®
®
¡ (1 + e)©
¸2
+
½+ ¿k
(1¡ ®) ³
¶
+ (31)
+
·
¡ @
@¿f
µ
©(1 + e)
¸2
¶¸
¸2
©
(1 + ¾)n+ ½
·
@
@¿f
µ
1 + e
¸
¶
¡ @
@¿f
µ
©(1 + e)
¸2
¶
¸2
©
¸
;
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where the …rst term is positive because @k@¿f is positive, ½+¿k is positive under the assumptions of the
proposition and we had previously assumed that the parameters must be such that 1+®® >
(1+e)©
¸2
in order to guarantee a positive level of consumption in equilibrium.
The second term of (31) will be positive whenever @@¿f
³
©(1+e)
¸2
´
is negative. This derivative is
given by the following expression, which is negative when ¿n > ¡57 :
@
@¿f
µ
©(1 + e)
¸2
¶
=
µ
©e
¸2
¶
2¯(1 + ¿f )
2 ¡ (1 + ¿n) [4¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]¡ 2 [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]
(1 + ¿f ) [(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]] :
The third term of (31) may be expressed as follows:
½e
(1 + ¿f )
·
2 (¿f ¡ ¿n)
(1 + ¿n)
+
(1 + ¿n) [4¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]¡ 2¯(1 + ¿f )2
(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿ f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]
¸
: (32)
For ¿n > ¡57 and ¿f ¸ ¿n; this expression is positive. However, if ¿f < ¿n the sign of the whole
expression is not so obvious. When ¿f < ¿n; the second term of expression (32) is increasing in s:
Therefore, it will approach its minimum value when s goes to zero. This implies that
(1 + ¿n) [4¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [2¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s]¡ 2¯(1 + ¿f )2
(1 + ¿n) [2¯(1 + ¿ f )¡ s] + 2 [¯(1 + ¿f )¡ s] >
2 (1 + ¿n) + 2¡ (1 + ¿f )
(2 + ¿n)
;
or equivalently that the term in brackets of equation (32) is larger than (1+¿f )(3+¿n)(1+¿n)(2+¿n) which is
positive for all values of ¿f and ¿n between -1 and 1.
In summary, it has been shown that the three terms are positive for the range of values of ¿n
and ¿k considered. Therefore, the derivative in (31) is positive.
Proof of Proposition 6. The derivative of steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit with
respect to the research tax is given by the following expression:
@c
@¿n
= (1¡ ®) ³ @k
@¿n
µ
1 + ®
®
¡ (1 + e)©
¸2
+
½+ ¿k
(1¡ ®) ³
¶
+
+
·
¡ @
@¿n
µ
©(1 + e)
¸2
¶¸
® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k® + ½
·
@
@¿n
µ
1 + e
¸
¶¸
; (33)
where the …rst term is positive since we have imposed 1+®® >
(1+e)©
¸2
. The second term is also
positive since
@
@¿n
µ
©(1 + e)
¸2
¶
=
µ
©
¸2
¶
s¡ (1 + ¿f ) [2¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s]
(1 + ¿f ) [(1 + ¿n) [2¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s]] ;
is negative. However, the last term has an ambiguous sign. The derivative in brackets may be
expressed as
@
@¿n
µ
1 + e
¸
¶
=
e¡ 1
2¸ (1 + ¿n)
:
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Thus, the sum of the second and third term of (33) yields
¡ ©
¸2
® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k® [s¡ (1 + ¿f ) [2¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s]]
(1 + ¿f ) [(1 + ¿n) [2¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s] + 2 [¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s]] + ½
e¡ 1
2¸ (1 + ¿n)
: (34)
Next, use (18) in order to write expression (34) as follows:
©n(1 + ¾)
·
2¯(1+¿f)¡s
(1+¿f)
¡ s
(1+¿f)
2
¸
2¯2 (1 + ¿f ) (1 + ¿n)
+
½©¸
·
(1+¿n)[2¯(1+¿f)¡s]
¯(1+¿f)¡s ¡ 2
¸·
2[¯(1+¿f)¡s]
(1+¿n)
+ s
(1+¿f)
¸
8¯2 (1 + ¿f ) (1 + ¿n)
The …rst term is positive while the sign of the second term is determined by
(1 + ¿n) [2¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s]
¯ (1 + ¿f )¡ s ¡ 2;
expression that happens to be positive for ¿n > ¡ s2¯(1+¿f)¡s :
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